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Though previous works have discussed the benefits of precolonial ethnic state centraliza-
tion for development in Africa, the findings, of a positive relationship between centralization
and development and the mechanisms provided, of local accountability of ethnic state leaders,
do not explain the heterogeneity in outcomes, reflected in the unequal distribution of access
to public services among formerly centralized states today. Here, I find that centralization
has had a negative effect on access to federally administrated, high state control goods when
cooperation failed between ethnic state and autocratic federal government leaders in the kind
of cooperative federalist regimes that defined much of colonial and postcolonial Africa. I
focus on the case of Nigeria, and specifically, I find a significant negative effect of centraliza-
tion on access to high federal state control goods for centralized states whose leaders failed
to cooperate with the autocratic military regime, and whose jurisdictions were subsequently
subject to a punishment regime, typified by underinvestment in public services, with lasting
impacts till today. I also posit that the long-term effects of this punishment can be seen in
the relatively lower reported trust in institutions of federal authority over traditional institu-
tions today from respondents from these previously punished, centralized precolonial states.
The results are robust to a number of controls and instrumenting for centralization with an
ecological diversity index.
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Though a growing number of recent studies on the origins of African economic development lit-
erature have documented a positive relationship between precolonial institutions, in the form of
precolonial ethnic state centralization, and modern development outcomes (Michalopoulos and
Pappaioanou, 2012; Gennaoili and Rainer, 2007; Osafo-Kwaako and Robinson, 2013), the mecha-
nisms through which this positive association operates remain weakly understood. Additionally,
there are no studies to date which explain the heterogeneity in current outcomes of formerly
centralized precolonial states. The results of this paper suggest a nonlinear relationship between
precolonial state centralization and current public service provision due to the interaction of
precolonial centralization with the colonial and postcolonial governments under the so-called co-
operative federalist political structures that defined much of colonized Africa. Specifically, I find
that the relationship between precolonial ethnic state leaders and autocratic federal state leaders
in the colonial and postcolonial eras determines public service access outcomes today. When co-
operation was the equilibrium outcome between centralized precolonial ethnic state leaders and
autocratic federal leaders, then public services were provided in centralized ethnic states through
patronage relationships. When cooperation failed between parties, then ethnic state leaders were
punished through underinvestment in goods and services whose allocation autocratic federal
governments could control.
I focus on the case of Nigeria, the most populous country on the continent with over 160 million
people currently to explain why the homelands of some of the most centralized former precolo-
nial states (for example in the current Borno and Yobe administrative states shown in Figure 2
below) have some of the worst economic development and public service access rates in the coun-
try today, going against the prevailing narrative of a positive relationship between precolonial
state centralization and current public service provision and development outcomes. In contrast
with the current literature, I show that the mechanism through which precolonial state central-
ization (c. 1850) impacted current public service provision is not ’local accountability’ as has
been posited in previous research (Gennaoili and Rainer, 2007; Herbst, 2000) but through payoffs
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from cooperation in a bilateral bargaining with cooperation ’game’ between ethnic state leaders
and federal authorities, first taking on the identity of the British colonial officials between 1885-
1960 and then in the form of the military government between 1966-1999. When cooperation
was the equilibrium outcome between centralized ethnic state leaders and autocratic federal au-
thorities, public service provision was positive for centralized states for federally administrated
public services under patronage relationships. When cooperation broke down, as it did between
certain centralized ethnic state leaders and the military government, then a punishment regime
was enacted by the federal military government leading to a negative relationship between cen-
tralization and access to federally administrated, high state control public infrastructure services
in areas where non-cooperation was the dominant strategy (due to differential British colonial
policy under indirect rule) of the centralized ethnic state leaders.
The study uses a novel survey dataset to measure public service provision outcomes and the
results of this paper can be summarized as below:
• H0: Precolonial state centralization has, on average, a positive effect on federally admin-
istrated (medium and high federal state control) goods, or goods for which cooperative
centralized ethnic state leaders were better positioned then and today to bargain for access
with federal authorities (patronage relationships). There is no effect of precolonial ethnic
state centralization on locally administrated (low federal state control) goods where there
is multilateral bargaining among different Local Government Area (LGA) actors and no
involvement of centralized ethnic state-leaders in good provision.
• H1: The main hypothesis is that the effect of centralization on access to federally adminis-
trated, high federal state control goods is negative for non-cooperative ethnic state leaders
subject to a subsequent punishment regime by autocratic federal military governments. I
test the specification presented in the Results section below where, following the Nigerian
historiography, my constructed supermajority Muslim indicator (measured as administra-
tive states with Muslim populations of greater than 70% of the total state population as
of 1952) is a proxy for, what I term, pre-independence centralization and subsequent non-
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cooperation of the centralized ethnic state with the military regime in the 1976 demolition
of the ’ethnic state leader/traditional leader’ system in favor of a democratically elected Lo-
cal Government Area (LGA) system (more on the history is covered in subsequent sections
and in the Appendix). I test the results in H0 and H1 with an OLS and IV specification,
adapting Fenske’s ecological diversity index (Fenske, 2014) as an instrument for precolonial
state centralization in the IV case; results remain significant in both. As a supplement to
this, I test and find that the ’punishment’ is worse in centralized, non-cooperating ethnic
states not favored by the military.
As an addendum, individuals from centralized, supermajority states where the punishment
regime was enacted in the 1976-1999 period of federal military rule seem less likely to report
’trust’ in federal institutions than their non-punished counterparts in centralized areas, based on
information from the 2012 Afrobarometer survey. This result suggests that one consequence of
the punishment regime was a negative impact on social capital between the federal government
and individuals from punished areas. IV notwithstanding, since this study is based on outcomes
from only 1 year of (cross-sectional) data from 2012, I argue for very strong, statistically sig-
nificant negative association between centralization and access to federally administrated, high
state control goods for ethnic states that did not cooperate with the federal military regime and
very strong, statistically significant positive association between centralization and access to fed-
erally administrated goods when cooperation was the dominant strategy for ethnic state leaders.
Figure 1 below shows a schematic of the classification of public service types covered in this
paper by federal administrated vs. locally administrated and by level of federal state control
of the good, where medium and high federal state control goods are federally administrated
and low state control goods are locally administrated. Note, the division of goods into feder-
ally and locally administrated categories reflects policy choices made by the federal government
rather than any technological capacity for provision of the public service at the local or federal
levels. The schematic captures a snapshot of administration and control of goods in the 2012
period for which the survey data was conducted. The classification of ’medium’ or ’high’ for
federally administrated goods reflects direct investments made and the length of time the good
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has spent under federal state control. So high state control goods like grid based power ac-
cess reflect investments made from starting in 1886 and largely in 1950 through the present and
flush toilet access reflects investments made largely around 1977 through the 1980s in Nigeria
by the federal, most notably military, regime. On the other hand medium federal state control
goods like immunization availability have been mostly administrated by the local government
(LGA), with exceptions; a notable one being in 2012, the year of our survey data, where the
federal government spearheaded administration of immunization availability with the first ever
national vaccine summit hosted in this year (Johns Hopkins, 2012) and directly solicited ethnic
state/traditional leaders’ participation/cooperation in ensuring maximum availability of the vac-
cines. Locally administrated goods like pit latrine access and most water access at public primary
schools have generally been under the responsibilities of the LGA in Nigeria and offgrid access
at public primary schools, our primary unit of observation would also fall under the general
purview of the LGA authority as well. Understanding the drivers behind the negative results
Figure 1: Schematic of the administration and extent of state control of public services mentioned
in the paper.
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for formerly centralized states and the historical mechanisms through which unequal access to
public goods in the country have manifested is a crucial first step for an assessment of ways to
solve these inequities, and potentially stem much of the violence erupting in those regions in
Nigeria today. The results of the paper highlight a point that has been made by economists (Ace-
moglu and Robinson, 2014; 2001) historians (Falola, Ogundiran, 2005), political geographers and
ecologists (Agnew, 2008; Robbins, 2011) and political scientists (Herbst, 2000; Mamdani, 1996) on
the long-term impacts of historical institutions and geography on current development outcomes
and point to the need for a further reexamination of the current role of ethnic state or traditional
leaders and the implications of their relationship with national entities on development outcomes
in the country today.
The layout of the paper is as follows in subsection 1.1 and 1.2, I briefly define some of the terms
used in this paper within the Nigerian context regarding cooperative federalism, dual author-
ity, and centralization and present an outline of the actors: ethnic states, current administrative
states, local governments and federal governments, mentioned in this paper. In section 1.3,
I briefly survey the related literature on the long-term impacts of geography and institutions,
highlighting the departure from and contribution to the literature by this paper. In section 2, I
provide a simple model of the calculus of non-cooperation for centralized ethnic states. In section
3, I cover the data, methods and empirical specification used in this study, focusing on the results
of the OLS specifications. Section 4 includes robustness checks for omitted variable bias executed
on our results with a brief discussion on the instrumental variable, ecological diversity used to
instrument for centralization here. In section 5, I provide the results of the empirical analysis.
Section 6 concludes with a brief discussion on directions for future research and potential policy
implications of this research. Additionally, in Section 7, the Appendix, I provide further evidence
from the Nigerian historiography of the mechanisms driving the aforementioned results.
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1.1 The Actors: Ethnic States, Administrative States, LGAs, LGA-Ethnic Areas and Govern-
ment Structure in Nigeria
Before the paper proceeds to the next section, it’s worth clarifying who the actors are at this
stage. Nigeria, currently is a federation made up of a democratically elected federal govern-
ment, 37 current administrative ’states’ or officially 36 current administrative states as mandated
by the 1999 constitution and a Federal Capital Territory (FCT) at Abuja. The states can be fur-
ther subdivided into 6 geopolitical zones, broadly amassed under the geopolitical North and the
geopolitical South (see (a) in Figure 2 below) with zones strongly correlated with current and his-
toric ethnic group location as shown in (b) of Figure 2 (so broadly the North-West is dominated
by the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups, the North-East is largely populated by the Kanuri ethnic
group and the South-West is dominated by the Yoruba ethnic group). The states can be further
subdivided into 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs), the smallest administrative unit in the
country (its equivalent is outlined in grey in (a)) which was created by federal military mandate
in 1976 to replace the Ethnic state leaders as the official arm of local governance in the country.
The other level of political geography this paper will discuss are the Ethnic states delineated
in (c) in Figure 2 below, showing the ethnicity based state formations c. 1850. Michalopoulos
and Wantchekon (2011) have confirmed a strong correlation (about .62) between location of re-
spondents to the Afrobarometer in 2005 (shown in (b) in Figure 2) and ethnic group location as
identified in the Murdock map (shown in (a) in Figure 2). In this paper, leaders of ethnic states as
defined in the 1850 map below will be referred to interchangeably as ethnic state leaders, ethnic
state kings/chiefs, and as we approach the period from 1885-1999, ’traditional leaders’ and ’Na-
tive Authorities’. The federal regime is the British colonial regime during the 1885-1960 period,
and is the military government during the 1966-1999 period (Elaigwu, 2002).
1.2 Cooperative Federalism, Dual Authority and Centralization in Nigeria 1850-1999
Although the title and the focus of this paper is on the effects of precolonial state centralization,
’precolonial’ denoting the period c.1850 in Nigerian history, the mechanisms we identify here
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Figure 2: Nigeria: the actors 1850-Present
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really span across 3 periods: the precolonial period c. 1850, the British colonial period from
1885-1960 and the military autocratic regimes from 1966-1999. An understanding of the negative
relationship between precolonial centralization and current public service provision argument
requires an understanding of the continuities between periods in Nigerian history, a continuity
that is often ignored in papers linking precolonial institutions to current development outcomes.
Here, I will outline a brief description of the terms used by political scientists to describe the
political structure of these periods namely: cooperative federalism, dual authority and central-
ization. I’ll start with the first 2.
Nigeria from 1885-1960 has been described as operating under a cooperative federalist system
with dual authority structures (Suberu, 2009; Abebe, 2013). In essence, this statement refers to
the fact that authority was distributed in the colonial and military regime periods between the
federal government (British or military) as an overarching, virtually autocratic in the British colo-
nial case and literally autocratic in the military regime case, authority and the subordinate ’local
government’ or subnational states in the form of local precolonial ethnic state ’kings’/leaders or
’traditional leaders’/Native Authorities as they came to be known under the colonial and mil-
itary regimes (Elaigwu, 2002; Dudley 1968; Suberu, 2009; Abebe, 2013; Osaghae, 1990, Salami,
2011; Volden, 2004). This was the ’federalism’ and ’dual authority’ system of the colonial and
military regimes. The ’cooperative’ aspect, which is at the heart of this paper’s thesis, comes in
to emphasize the idea that cooperation was necessary between, first in the colonial period, the
British colonials and the ethnic state leaders and in the following military regime, between the
military officials and ethnic state leaders so that the latter, ethnic state leaders, could implement
federal policies of the former, particularly as relating to tax collection. Later, during the mili-
tary regime when the 1970s oil boom transformed the tax base for the federal government and
rendered the role of local tax revenue ’obsolete’ and the political autonomy of some centralized
ethnic states a threat to military hegemony, cooperation with the federal government was typi-
fied by acquiescence with the turnover of local governance from the ethnic state leader led Native
Authority system to the democratically elected Local Government Area (LGA) system in 1976. In
return for their cooperation, ethnic state leaders were able to bargain for access to federally con-
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trolled resources in the form of public services administered by the federal government through
patronage relationships. The big question here, again at the core of this paper, is the one asked
by Roderick M. Hills in his well cited 1998 paper on cooperative federalism, paraphrased as
’what happens when the (autocratic) federal state and subnational/local govt. in the form of the
centralized ethnic state leader, refuse to cooperate?’ (Hills, 1998). Magaloni (2006) provides an
answer, which forms the basis of the paper’s thesis, in the form of ’punishment regimes’ where
these federal states punish opposition or non-cooperation by underinvestment in public services
in the defectors’ regions given that they are able to ’target the services’ (i.e. for high federal
state control services) and monitor/identify the defectors (easily achieved for ethnic states with
centralized systems of governance).
Next, it’s important to clarify what is meant by ’centralization’ here, particularly since it’s a term
that has experienced a resurgence both in the ’long-term impacts of precolonial institutions in
Africa’ political economy literature and the current literature on public goods and decentraliza-
tion, popular in the current political science literature. Within Nigeria, there are 2 periods of
centralization as relating to ethnic states that occur and are relevant for the subsequent analysis
presented here. First, there is the period of ’precolonial ethnic state centralization’ where central-
ization here refers to ethnic state sovereignty on the eve of colonialism c. 1850. Here ethnic state
sovereignty is the control of territory and people by acquiring and maintaining military force
that was characteristic of this period in mid 19th century Nigerian history (Blench et al., 2006;
Falola, 2005; Ogundiran, 2005; Ogbomo, 2005; Fenske, 2014). The measure of precolonial ethnic
state centralization used here is from George Peter Murdock’s (1967) Ethnographic Atlas, which
coded ethnic states c.1850 with a ’Jurisdictional Hierarchy beyond the Local community level’
index, described as an index of ’political complexity’ and represented as an ordered variable
from 0-4, where 0 indicates "stateless societies "lacking any form of centralized political organi-
zation" and 4 indicates groups that were part of large states and generally ruled by ethnic state
leaders in the form of chiefs who had held successful military campaigns for control of territory
in the mid-19th century as shown in (c) of Figure 2 (see Michalopoulos and Pappaioanou, 2012;
Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Ogbomo, 2005). Here we delineate precolonial ethnic states into
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centralized and non-centralized where centralized states are states receiving a score above 0, or
states with any level of political complexity above "stateless" as identified in the Murdock Atlas
and subsequently states with any form of ethnic state leadership identified (from ’petty chiefs’
to more powerful kings and monarchs). More on this variable will be discussed in Section 3 on
Data used in this paper.
The next period of centralization of ethnic states spans between 1885-1960 and refers to what
can be termed ’pre-independence centralization’. This period of pre-independence centralization
relates to the role of the British colonial regime in increasing the autonomy and consolidating
power in the hands of the Northern Emirs overseeing highly muslim populated areas in Nigeria.
This process, replicated in different iterations throughout much of colonized Africa and known
as ’indirect rule’ has so far been largely neglected in the political economy and development
economics literatures on the impacts of precolonial African institutions (which use the Murdock
measure, and assume centralization is static), though it has been discussed extensively by his-
torians and political scientists concerning Nigeria and Africa more generally (Mamdani, 1996;
Dudley, 1968; Tonwe and Osomwota, 2013). Mamdani (1996) in particular, has referred to this
hyper-centralization of power in the hands of the Emirs by the British colonial regime as cre-
ating a system of ’decentralized despotism’ in these areas with Dudley (1968) quoting F.W. de
St. Croix that the ’Emir quickly became an absolute ruler’ during this period under the British
system. This context is extremely important for the thesis outlined in this paper regarding the
calculus of non-cooperation among these (hyper) centralized, supermajority muslim states, and
is explored further in the Appendix.
1.3 Related Literature
As alluded to in the Introduction, one of the main departures of this paper from the economics
literature on precolonial centralization is its assertion that precolonial ethnic state centralization
can lead to negative outcomes for public service provision when cooperation fails between ethnic
state leaders and autocratic federal authorities in the kind of cooperative federalist regimes that
characterized much of colonized Africa, and Nigeria in particular during the colonial and mili-
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tary rule periods. This argument is in contrast with accounts from Gennaoili and Rainer (2007),
Michalopoulos and Pappioanou (2012) and Green and Bandopadhay (2012) who document a
positive relationship between centralization and development outcomes without consideration
for within state heterogeneity in the relationship. The paper also presents an alternate mecha-
nism to motivate the relationship between precolonial centralization and public service provision,
albeit one that does not rely on a notion of ’local accountability’ of centralized ethnic state leaders
to motivate the relationship (Gennaoili and Rainer, 2007), but is grounded in the political science
theory (Suberu, 2009; Hills, 1998; Magaloni, 2001) on the relationship between actors under coop-
erative federalist regimes and autocratic federal governments, the political geography literature
(Agnew, 2008; Mann, 1984) on the relationship between state despotic power and state infrastruc-
tural power and evidence of the manifestation of these theories within the Nigerian context and
from the historiographic literature (Falola, 2005; Ogundiran, 2005; Mamdani, 1996; Tonwe and
Osomwota, 2013; Dudley, 1968; Blench et. al, 2006). Another departure is to view centralization
as dynamic and consider the impact of British colonial policy in reshaping the precolonial ethnic
centralization landscape, along with the implications of the resulting pre-independence central-
ization on subsequent relations between ethnic state leaders and military officials in the period
following the colonial regime/independence.
An additional contrast with previous literature is the use of a novel survey dataset that aggre-
gates point data at the LGA-Ethnic area level to measure outcomes for public service provision.
Doing this enables the paper to overcome some of the criticisms of the night lights density data
approach taken by previous authors (Michalopoulos and Pappioanou, 2012) regarding the esti-
mates not properly accounting for population effects and the luminosity data being dominated
by noise in less densely populated areas (Cognac and Dupraz, 2014). The results we find on
the effect of centralization on federally administrated goods also contrast with Bandopadyhay
and Green (2012) whose study does not find a relationship between centralization and so called
’public goods’ in their Uganda sample.
The paper contributes to the growing body of economic literature on the impacts of ethnic
12
inequality and precolonial/historical institutions on African development outcomes including
Alesina et.al (2012), Bates(1983), Acemoglu and Robinson (2014), Nunn(2009), and Osafo-Kwako
and Robinson (2013), Fenske(2009; 2014).
2 Simple Model: Calculus of Non-cooperation by Centralized Ethnic State Leaders
Federal governments allocate federally administrated public services Yf and high federal state
control services Yhf to ethnic state areas subject to cooperation from centralized ethnic state lead-
ers such that the utility Ui of non-cooperation for ethnic state leaders is kept at or below some
reservation utility (which, WLOG, can be specified at 0); one question here, is when do central-
ized ethnic state leaders choose non-cooperation? The calculus of non-cooperation for centralized
ethnic state leaders can then be simplified in the toy model below as follows:
Ui = βi E[cti ]− αi E[ f j] (1)
βi =

δ if cti = 1, 0 < δ ≤ 1
0 if cti = 0
αi =

γ if f j(θ) = 0, 1 < γ < ∞
τ if f j(θ) = 1, 0 < τ ≤ 1
In the above, Ui is the utility of the ethnic state leader i from non-cooperation with the fed-
eral government j where j can be the British colonial (j = 1)or military regime(j = 2). β is a
weight that assigns benefits to noncooperation as a function of cti , t ∈ 1, 2 ,where cti stands for
precolonial centralization in the British colonial period (t = 1), and in the military rule period
(t = 2), subsequent pre-independence centralization and with cti , equal 0 and 1 representing non-
centralized (’decentralized’ in the pre-independence case) and centralized (’hypercentralized’ in
the pre-independence case) status respectively. δ is the fraction of autonomy or political control
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within their region that an ethnic state leader can ’capture’. αi is the cost of non-cooperation
to the ethnic state leader in terms of punishment from the autocratic federal regime in terms of
f j ∈ (0, 1) which is the "favor" assigned to the ethnic state leader by the federal regime. Subjec-
tive, uniformly distributed (0, 1) prior probabilities θ are assigned to type f j by the ethnic state
leader. When the ethnic state leader is of type f j = 0, punishment γ can be large enough to
erode any gains from non-cooperation (e.g. exile, beheadings and post the 1970s oil boom and
subsequent federal investments in grid based electricity and flush toilet/septic tank installation,
underinvestment in high federal state control goods, Yhf ) and when ethnic state leader is of type
f j = 1, punishment is generally small relative to maximum benefits to the ethnic state leader from
non-cooperation. So the ethnic state leader chooses non-cooperation when their prior θ is close to
0 and their expected Ui ≥ 0 which as shown in schematic in Figure 3 below was the outcome for
centralized pre-colonial and subsequently hyper-centralized through differential British colonial
policy, pre-independence ethnic state leaders.
Figure 3: Calculus of non-cooperation by centralized ethnic state leaders
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3 Data and Identification Strategy
3.1 Data on Precolonial State Centralization and Pre-independence Centralization/Non-cooperation
The data on precolonial ethnic state centralization used here comes from George Murdock’s
(1967) Ethnographic Atlas showing the spatial distribution of ethnicities across Africa around
the mid/late 19th century (Michalopoulos, 2012). Murdock’s map includes 843 ethnic areas,
117 of which are contained within the boundaries of present day Nigeria. Michalopoulos and
Wantchekon (2011) have confirmed a strong correlation (about .62) between location of respon-
dents to the Afrobarometer in 2005 and ethnic group location as identified in the Murdock map.
We intersect the location of Nigeria’s 774 LGAs with Murdock’s ethnic state partitions to create
1415 new LGA-Ethnic state partitions. Murdock’s atlas includes 60 variables capturing cultural,
geographical and economic traits of 1270 ethnicities around the world. Following Michalopoulos
(2012) and Gennaoli and Rainer (2007), precolonial political institutions are proxied using Mur-
dock’s (1967) "Jurisdictional Hierarchy Beyond the Local Community Level", with what he terms
an index of "political complexity" (the Centralization index) which assigns a score between 0 to 4
to each ethnic state unit and describes the number of political jurisdictional hierarchies above the
local level for each unit. The score is defined as follows: 0: so-called stateless societies, "lacking
any form of political organization" 1 and 2: petty and larger paramount chiefdoms 3 and 4: large,
more organized states.
Centralization data is available for 61 of the 117 ethnic states within Nigeria, or 945 LGA-Ethnic
state units in the country and the maximum Centralization score within Nigeria is a 3, repre-
sented by large states like the Yoruba and the Edo. Michalopoulos (2012) has provided a cross-
validation of Murdock’s Centralization index in Africa through a reading of African history
and we confirm the same through a survey of the Nigerian historiography on levels of political
complexity among precolonial ethnic states (Falola, 2005; Ogundiran, 2005). For example, the
Yoruba and Edo, who score a 3 on Murdock’s index are consistently identified as large, central-
ized groups in the late 19th century period. The Igbo, interestingly enough who score a 1 on
the Murdock indicator with low levels of centralization are identified as having sub-states with
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more centralized systems, like the trading states of the Aro oligarchy in the 17th-18th centuries
(Okpoko, Obi-Ani, 2005). Addressing the peculiarities of centralization in Nigeria, particularly in
the status of the Igbo, we create a modified index of the one used by Gennaoili and Rainer that is
an indicator that assigns a score of 0 to ’0’ coded societies in the Murdock specification and 1 to
any ethnic states with scores above 0 that captures any degree of precolonial centralization in the
sample (c1i in the model). Our results are robust to alternate specifications of the Centralization
index, using our binary variable or the full index from Murdock (1967).
For the measure of pre-independence centralization (c2i in the model) , following the historiogra-
phy I use the percentage of the Muslim population in each administrative state as of 1952 (Ostien,
2012) to create a supermajority Muslim indicator where states are assigned a score of 1 if they
have a population of greater than 70% at the upper quartile of the percentage Muslim distribu-
tion. In alternate specifications I include an indicator for ’no military president’ that assigns 1 if
no military president originated from the state between the 1976-1999 period of the punishment
regime as a measure of f2 = 0.
3.2 Dependent Variables: Measures of Infrastructure Access, Public Health and Trust
In an effort spearheaded by the Nigerian government, researchers from the Nigeria’s Office of the
Senior Special Assistant to the President on MDGs (OSSAP ) in collaboration with the Sustainable
Engineering Lab at Columbia University conducted extensive, comprehensive surveys of schools
and health facilities at LGAs, attaining responses to questions concerning power, water and
sanitation access, among other indicators over a 1 year period closing in 2012. The surveys
were collected from principals at 68,627 schools and over 30,000 health facilities across 764 of
774 LGAs in Nigeria (with the last 10 LGAs dropped due to unreliable data). Over 81% of
the schools were public primary schools. The results remain largely unchanged when only the
public primary school sample is used. For power access, respondents were asked True/False
questions about both access and functionality. An aggregate power score of 0 or 1 was assigned
to a school depending on if the respondent answered False or True, to the question of whether
the respondent had access to functional power from the national grid, functional power from a
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generator or functional power from a solar system. Similarly, an aggregate sanitation score of 0 or
1 was assigned to a school depending on if the respondent answered False or True to the question
of whether the respondent had access to improved sanitation in the form of a functional flush
or improved pour flush toilet, or access to a functional improved ventilated latrine or access to a
functional pit latrine with a slab. If the respondent responded True to any one of these improved
sanitation options, they were assigned a sanitation score of 1, if they responded False to all of the
aforementioned options, then they were assigned a sanitation score of 0. Lastly, for water access,
which was potable water access, we assigned an aggregate potable water access score of 0 or 1 to
a school depending on if the respondent answered False or True to the question of whether they
had access to potable water in the form of functional piped water or functional borehole or tube
well water.
Lastly, for each intersected LGA-Ethnic state area, the proportions of schools with individual
Grid, Flush, overall Power, overall Water etc scores of 1 were calculated and used as the metric of
overall Grid, Flush etc access. Note, that ’access’ refers to available functionality though strong
correlations with LGA-Ethnic mean Night-lights density data as shown in table x suggests that
these metrics are a good indication of overall access for the country. Night light density per LGA-
Ethnic area is included as a dependent variable and a check in alternate specifications. Available
data on child health immunizations and health professional density were similarly calculated for
each LGA-Ethnic area.
I also construct a new measure of Trust in federal institutions over traditional or ethnic state
leaders or ’trust in police over traditional leaders’ based on the 2012 Afrobarometer survey (round
5) for Nigeria where respondents were asked to respond to the question ’If you were a victim of
crime in this country, who if anyone, would you go to first for assistance? (Q12)’ The measure
is a difference between the proportion of respondents who say they would go to police and the
proportion of respondents who say they would go to their traditional leaders, two of the top
answers (including family members for the top 3), in the survey.
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3.3 Control Variables and Ecological Diversity
As mentioned earlier, researchers from a diverse range of fields have highlighted the long-term
impacts of geographic, disease covariates, population density and other ethnic group traits on
access to public services. So a range of confounding variables are controlled for including:
• a. Population density in 2006- by LGA from the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics:
Since public infrastructure provision planning decisions are often made taking maximum
coverage by population into consideration. Population density is indeed significant in most
specifications and is controlled for in all specifications.
• b. Distance to the capital Abuja- to test that being closer to an area of concentrated economic
and political influence translates to heightened access to public infrastructure services. Dis-
tance is measured as the distance from the centroid of the LGA-Ethnic Area to the capital.
• c. Mean elevation: calculated in km, and might be expected to impact the costs associated
with the construction of certain infrastructure and the ease of creating centralized groups
and hence is controlled for here as well.
• d. Slavery- an indicator for the presence of slavery, based on the V70 variable from the
Murdock (1967) Ethnographic atlas, following Michalopoulos’ (2012) specification. There’s
been previous research conducted on the long-term effects of the slave trade on modern
development outcomes (Nunn, 2008) so it is included as a control here.
• e. Petrol- an indicator for the presence of petroleum resources, to control for the presence of
resource wealth on public service provision, based on data from ’The Petroleum Dataset’.
• f. Land suitability for agriculture- Ecological feature to test that centralization of groups
was driven by their location in more favorable areas for crops and pasture. Data from the
FAO.
• g. Ruggedness- Following (Fenske, 2014) and Nunn and Paguda (2007) control for rugged-
ness of the terrain which was related to the cost of capturing slaves using data sourced
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from Fenske (2014).
• h. Malaria- Disease control using climatic suitability for malaria transmission from Adjuik
et. al (1998) to address the various hypotheses in the literature on the negative impacts on
malaria on African development outcomes (Gallup and Sachs, 2001).
In the IV empirical specification described in the section below, I instrument for centralization
with an ecological diversity index based on the Fenske (2014) paper, which is a Herfindahl index
that calculates the share sig of each ethnic state i’s area that is occupied by each major ecological
type g (with 7 of the 18 total in Africa found in Nigeria) and constructed as follows:






More on the index will be discussed in section 4 on robustness checks below.
3.4 Empirical Specification
My baseline specification is an OLS model with an interaction term as described below:
To test H0, of precolonial centralization’s effect on federally administrated medium and high
federal state control goods, I use the following specification:
Yl,e = α0 + α1Cente + X′l,eγ+ el,e (3)
The dependent variable is my measure of survey-based infrastructure access or nationally led
health access outcomes (yellow fever and meningitis immunization) in 2012, the year of our sur-
vey, in LGA l in ethnic group e from my survey data. Cente is the binary precolonial centralization
indicator at the Ethnic state level. X is a vector of controls. I include state clustered, robust er-
rors in all my specifications. In alternate specifications, I also include night-lights density as a
dependent variable.
To test H1, my main hypothesis of the effect of precolonial centralization on access to federally
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administrated high federal state control goods being negative in the presence of hypercentral-
ized pre-independence centralization level driven non-cooperation and a subsequent punish-
ment regime enacted by the autocratic federal govt., I test the following specification where my
constructed supermajority muslim is a measure for pre-independence hyper-centralization and
non-cooperation of the centralized precolonial, hyper-centralized pre-independence ethnic states
with the military federal regime post the 1976 military LGA order,
Yl,e = α0 + α1Cente + α2S.Muslim + βCentxS.Muslim + X′l,eγ+ el,e (4)
In robustness checks for omitted variable bias using the OLS model, I use ecological diversity
as an instrument for precolonial state centralization in a 2SLS specification. Note, the exclusion
restriction is not satisfied in the health immunization case since studies have documented an
inverse relationship between disease risk and ecological (particularly species) diversity and it
appears there is higher availability of immunization in areas that are less ecologically diverse
and presumably have higher disease risk (Keesing et al., 2006). For all other relevant dependent
variables, the instrument remains valid and results from those specifications are presented here.
To further check the results from the OLS model, I also use a multilevel, random slopes specifi-
cation, allowing the coefficient on precolonial centralization to vary spatially by administrative
states a as follows:
Yl,e = α0 + αa1Cente + X
′
l,eγ+ el,e (5)
and confirm visually the negative coefficient in supermajority states as mapped in Figure 5.
The multilevel spatially varying coefficient model also allows precise identification of which
administrative state where the coefficient turns negative or where the punishment regime appears
to have had the most effect on access to the aforementioned high federal state control goods, grid
access and flush toilet access.
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To test the supplement to H1 above that the sign becomes more negative in f j = 0 areas, I also test
the alternate specification for the high federal state control goods with a ’no military president’
interaction as follows:
Yl,e = α0+ α1Cente + α2S.Muslim+ α3NoMilitary+ β1CentxS.Muslim+ β2CentxNoMilitary+X′l,eγ+ el,e
(6)
Finally, to test the addendum on trust in police over traditional leaders being lower in super-
majority muslim (punished), precolonial era centralized states, since most of the respondents
were from precolonial centralized state areas (95% of the Afrobarometer sample), I look at
the split sample within centralized states and examine the responses of supermajority to non-
supermajority muslim state respondents using first a chi-square test and then an OLS specifi-
cation. Inference here are correlations, and given the small sample, the results should not be
overstated here. The OLS model was specified as follows:
Trust in Police over Traditional Leadersl = α0 + α1S.Muslim(Cent = 1) + X′l,eγ+ el,e (7)
4 Robustness Checks: Instrumental Variables and Spatial Autocorrelation
Omitted variable bias is a concern with cross-sectional data, and there may be concerns of the
potential endogeneity of the centralization variable. In alternate specifications, I instrument for
centralization with a Hierfindahl/ecological diversity index adapted from Fenske’s 2014 paper,
which accounts for the probability that 2 or more different ecological zones are contained within
a particular Ethnic state area as an instrument for state centralization. Following Fenske’s claim,
from Bates (1983) that states on ecological boundaries were able to benefit from gains from trade
which then fueled higher levels of centralization, I examine this correlation within the Nigeria
region, made up of 7 different vegetation zones or major vegetation types (from White’s 1983 his-
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torically reconstructed map) including forest, woodland, bushland and thicket, azonal vegetation
and anthropic landscapes1 as shown in Figure 4 (See Fenske (2014) for further discussion). Fol-
lowing Cameron et al. (2010), I account for spatial autocorrelation by clustering robust standard
errors by state; I also test alternate specifications of a spatial error model with different spatial
weight matrices and Conley standard errors with largely unchanged results (Conley, 2008). I
present the results with clustered errors in this paper. I also test the split sample to verify the
confidence intervals for the negative coefficient on my interaction terms and confirm that my
findings of a negative effect coefficient for centralization on the public service outcome variables
in the supermajority muslim subsample are significant and negative at the 90% confidence inter-
val. To account for concerns about normally distributed residuals, I correct for skew in the power
access variables with box-cox, yeo-johnson transformed versions of the variables and the results
remain unchanged.
5 Results
The results of the empirical specifications are presented and discussed below for each of the
paper hypotheses, H0 (R0), H1 (R1) and the addendum on trust. Summary statistics for all
variables are listed in Tables 1 and 2 with correlation matrices for infrastructure access variables
and night light density in Table 3 and night light density with health access variables in Table
4. The correlation between the night lights density data and grid-based electricity access is the
second highest in the sample at about .616 after the correlation between night lights density and
flush toilets access (at .689) and highly significant for both. This result acts as a check to show that
though the data is from public schools, it appears to accurately capture the overall distribution
of access to public services in the country.
• R0: Precolonial state Centralization has had, on average, a positive effect on federally ad-
ministrated (medium and high federal state control) goods, or goods for which cooperative
centralized ethnic state leaders were better positioned then and today to bargain for access
1The full list of major types include forest, forest transitions and mosaics, woodland, woodland mosaics and
transitions, bushland and thicket, azonal vegetation and anthropic landscapes. There are 15 sub-classified minor
types including swamp forest, lowland rain forest, mangrove and the Jos Plateau mosaic
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Figure 4: Nigeria Ecological Diversity Index
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with federal authorities ( the benefits of bilateral bargaining in the cooperative federalist
structure). There is no effect of precolonial ethnic state centralization on locally admin-
istrated (low federal state control) goods where there is multilateral bargaining among
different Local Government Area (LGA) actors and no involvement of centralized ethnic
state-leaders in good provision.
Tables 5 show the OLS results where precolonial ethnic state centralization increases access to
federally administrated goods. Precolonial centralization is strongly significantly associated with
a .04 or 4% increase in grid-based power access in the un-interacted model, a .517 or increase in
health professional density, and a .07 and .047 increase in yellow fever immunization and menin-
gitis immunization respectively and weakly associated with an increase in flush toilet access of
.019 or about 2%.This results are very interesting, particularly in the case of public services, grid-
based electricity and flush toilets where mean access to grid based electricity and flush toilets
is only 13% and 12% in the public schools based survey sample. For locally administrated, low
federal state control goods there is no effect at all of centralization on access to these services,
including pit latrine and water access as depicted in Table 6 providing support for H0 above.
Given that the mechanism through which centralization affects public services is, as posited in
this paper, cooperation and patronage relationships between centralized ethnic state leaders and
federal governments, the 0 effect size for local government administrated goods is not surprising,
since the actors (the elected LGA officials) have no involvement in the cooperative relationship
with the federal government described previously. In fact the lack of bilateral bargaining, and
lack of the implicit monitoring that typifies the centralized ethnic state and federal government
relationship creates opportunities for corruption where functional local services are not provided
are the LGA level (more on this in the Appendix).
• R1: The effect of precolonial centralization on access to federally administrated, high fed-
eral state control goods is negative for non-cooperative ethnic state leaders subject to a
subsequent punishment regime by autocratic federal governments. And the results are ro-
bust to the IV specification. As an addendum to this, ’punishment’ is worse in centralized,
non-cooperating ethnic states not favored by the military.
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Table 7 below illustrates R1 above, for high federal state control goods grid based electricity and
flush toilet access where non-cooperation typified in the supermajority muslim interaction re-
duces access to the grid by a statistically significant, -.01 or 1% (shown in column (2)) and access
to flush toilets by a significant positive -.02 points or 2%. Illustrating the addendum in R1, when
we account for f2 = 0 or being a non-favored by the military state, in the form of no military
president originating from your state, the effect of precolonial centralization is on grid access and
flush toilet access becomes even more negative, reducing grid access by -.041 or 4% and flush
toilet access by -.031 or 3%. Robustness checks in the split sample indicate that the coefficients are
significantly negative at the 90% confidence level in the sample. This significant negative effect
of centralization on public service provision supports the historiography documenting the exis-
tence of a punishment regime enacted by the military government during the 1976-1999 period
of military rule. The result also contradicts previous notions of precolonial ethnic state central-
ization always having a positive effect for public service provision. When we allow precolonial
centralization to interact with the events that happened during the colonial and postcolonial
eras, specifically relating to the cooperation/patronage and non-cooperation/punishment struc-
ture that was at the heart of the cooperative federalist regimes that typified Nigeria and much of
colonized Africa, the relationship between precolonial centralization and modern development
outcomes in the form of public service provision is not always positive. Results for the interac-
tion are largely insignificant for the medium state control goods, in line with our theory on the
effects of the punishment regime for military era controlled and provided goods.
The IV results qualitatively support the OLS results with Table 8 showing the first stage results
and providing support for the strength of ecological diversity as an instrument for centralization.
2nd Stage IV results are shown in Tables 10 and Tables 9 below and again reinforce the OLS
results on cooperation and punishment as described above, though the difference in magnitude
between the OLS and IV second stage coefficients suggest cautious interpretation of the effect
sizes in the IV specification. The difference in magnitude of the IV estimates could suggest the
existence of measurement error in the centralization indicator, where the centralization indicator
is an imperfect proxy for political complexity. There’s also a possibility that the exclusion re-
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striction may not be perfectly satisfied here, though given the outcome variables of interest are
infrastructure like grid based electricity and flush toilets, it is more likely that the issue here is
measurement error and not a failure of the exclusion restriction. Coefficients from the OLS are
interpreted here.
Visualization of results from the multilevel model for grid access showing the administrative
states where the coefficient on precolonial centralization turns negative are shown in (a) in Figure
5 below, along with a map showing the supermajority muslim areas in darkest brown in (d) and
a map showing the states from which the military presidents originated between the 1976-1999
punishment period provided in (c):
Figure 5: Current State Level Coefficients for Effect of Centralization on Grid Access with p-
values Labeled (heterogeneity with multilevel model)
Lastly, to illustrate the long-term effects on social capital between the federal government and in-
dividuals from punished areas, a simple Chi-square test on proportions shows that in the sample
of centralized precolonial ethnic states, respondents to the 2012 Afrobarometer question of "Who
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would you go to first for help if you were the victim of a crime?" from centralized supermajority
muslim states are less likely to go to police (a federal institution) over their traditional leaders
(58%) versus respondents from centralized non-supermajority muslim states (73%) as shown in
Figure 8 (p < .1). Results from the OLS specification are shown in Table 12 below. Given the small
number of independent samples in the split sample approach, significance of the supermajority
muslim indicator in the centralized state sample is unstable, though the coefficient is negative
(sometimes significantly negative) with membership in centralized, supermajority states seeming
to reduce the "likelihood" of going to the police over traditional leaders by a magnitude of about
-.17 to -.24 in all specifications. This relatively lower trust in federal institutions like police over
traditional leaders in punished areas versus non punished areas might suggest evidence of the
persistent impacts of the punishment regime on social capital between punished areas and the
federal government, though given the small sample size in the split sample approach, the results
are significant correlations and the effect sizes should not be overstated here.
Evidence from the Nigerian historiography of the mechanisms and results presented is provided
in the Appendix.
6 Conclusions, Further Research and Policy Implications
In this paper, I find that evidence for a negative relationship between precolonial state central-
ization and public service provision as a development outcomes under certain conditions un-
examined in the previous literature. The results indicate that the heterogeneity in development
outcomes for precolonial centralized ethnic states reflected in differential public service provision
in much of colonized Africa can be explained within the context of cooperative/patronage and
non-cooperative/punishment relationships with a negative relationship between precolonial eth-
nic state centralization and current development found in some areas. I use the Nigeria case as
a quasi-natural experiment along with a novel survey dataset to investigate this heterogeneity in
outcomes of precolonial ethnic states. The political theory, empirical analysis and historiographic
evidence proffered above, all appear to point to the existence of a punishment regime, defined by
not so benign neglect, under the autocratic federal military government where high federal state
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control services were provided when cooperation between precolonial centralized ethnic states
and the autocratic federal regime was in effect, and under-provided for non-cooperating cen-
tralized ethnic states in the cooperative federalist system that existed between autocratic federal
states and centralized ethnic states in Nigeria and much of colonized Africa. Another contribu-
tion to the literature is to present centralization as a dynamic process and underline the role of
colonial policy in the pre-independence "hyper-centralization" of certain precolonial centralized
ethnic states, under British colonial policy, with implications for the failure of cooperation with
the subsequent military regime. A further contribution of this paper is to attempt to present a
structured approach to the understanding of the mechanisms underlying the effects of precolo-
nial centralization on current development outcomes.
Though we use ecological diversity as an instrument for centralization here, further research is
needed to examine the drivers of the precolonial centralization variable used. One study has sug-
gested examining the role of interstate warfare (following Tilly’s "war makes states, states make
war" hypothesis (Tilly,1985)) in state centralization by examining the the use of plants for poisons
and medicines in so-called ’biological warfare’ (Akiwunmi and Filaba, 2005) to strengthen state
sovereignty; there is potential for using ethnobotanic records and environmental historical mod-
eling of plant distribution to gain more insight into the role of environmentally backed interstate
warfare in precolonial state centralization.
On the policy implications, this study also touches on the potentially important roles of current
non-state actors like traditional leaders in facilitating public service expansion in the country by
capitalizing on historic social capital in formerly centralized ethnic states reflected in attitudes as
the ones presented in the 2008 Afrobarometer Nigeria survey where almost 60% of respondents
felt that traditional leader influence in local government should increase. Finally, particularly
given the recent outbreaks of violence and social upheaval in those areas, there might be some
role for an affirmative action policy aimed at improving development outcomes for areas that
suffered from underinvestment under the military punishment regime though further work is
needed to understand the full extent of this throughout the country.
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Table 1: Outcomes(Infrastructure and Health Access, Light and Trust) Summary Statistics (Ob-
servations are LGA-Ethnic states)
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Power 945 0.19 0.20 0.00 1.00
Grid 945 0.13 0.16 0.00 1.00
Offgrid 945 0.10 0.14 0.00 1.00
Sanitation 945 0.41 0.24 0.00 1.00
Flush 945 0.12 0.16 0.00 1.00
Latrine 945 0.27 0.20 0.00 1.00
Water 945 0.29 0.20 0.00 1.00
Piped Water 945 0.04 0.09 0.00 1.00
Tubewell 945 0.22 0.18 0.00 1.00
Yellow Fever Immunization 900 0.56 0.24 0.00 1.00
Meningitis Immunization 900 0.18 0.19 0.00 1.00
Health Professionals Density 900 1.99 2.54 0.00 44.79
Log Night Light Density 943 1.76 0.63 1.13 4.14
Police Over Traditional Trust 224 0.34 0.37 −0.88 1.00
Police Trust 224 0.50 0.24 0.00 1.00
Traditional Leader Trust 224 0.16 0.19 0.00 0.88
Notes: See text for more details. Power, Sanitation and Water were constructed from
responses to ’or’ questions, e.g. for Power access, ’do you have power from the grid
or an offgrid source?’ at schools. So Power is in effect a union of Grid and Offgrid
access but note since the overall Power access numeral takes only unique responses, the
estimate for Power is lower than the actual sum of Grid and Offgrid for Power displayed
in the above table. Calculations were executed in ArcGIS so Sanitation and Water access
estimates are slightly inflated since points falling on the borders of LGA-Ethnic polygons
were counted twice, the measured error is minute and inconsequential when adjusted
for in later analysis.
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Table 2: Controls Summary Statistics (Observations are LGA-Ethnic states)
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Centralization (bin) 945 0.89 0.32 0 1
Centralization (full) 945 1.51 0.88 0 3
Supermajority Muslim 945 0.25 0.43 0 1
No Military President 945 0.82 0.38 0 1
Population Density 945 690.19 2, 352.28 6.90 41, 012.70
Mean Elevation 859 286.96 251.69 −0.25 1, 829.00
Distance to Capital 945 410.61 169.29 13.29 825.47
Petrol 945 0.25 0.43 0 1
Mean Agricultural Suitability 925 4.73 0.79 0.00 6.00
Slavery 921 0.99 0.07 0 1
Malaria 945 0.99 0.03 0.72 1.00
Ruggedness 945 0.28 0.25 0.03 2.28
Ecological Diversity* 945 0.26 0.24 0.00 0.66
Notes: See text for details. *Ecological diversity is used in the IV specification only. Models are tested
with the binary and full Centralization index. Results from the binary Centralization variable are re-
ported in this paper.
Table 3: Night Light Density and Infrastructure Access Correlation Matrix (Night light density
has highest correlation with Power (.6) over Sanitation (.4) and Water (.4))
Correlations Night Lights Power Grid Offgrid Sanitation Flush Latrine Water Piped Tubewell
Night Lights 1 0.594 0.616 0.424 0.431 0.689 −0.055 0.397 0.329 0.393
Power 0.594 1 0.873 0.807 0.544 0.674 0.108 0.535 0.404 0.468
Grid 0.616 0.873 1 0.489 0.483 0.644 0.059 0.479 0.468 0.432
Offgrid 0.424 0.807 0.489 1 0.469 0.594 0.120 0.469 0.236 0.431
Sanitation 0.431 0.544 0.483 0.469 1 0.538 0.729 0.445 0.258 0.421
Flush 0.689 0.674 0.644 0.594 0.538 1 −0.120 0.522 0.285 0.523
Latrine −0.055 0.108 0.059 0.120 0.729 −0.120 1 0.131 0.106 0.089
Water 0.397 0.535 0.479 0.469 0.445 0.522 0.131 1 0.403 0.735
Piped 0.329 0.404 0.468 0.236 0.258 0.285 0.106 0.403 1 0.160
Tubewell 0.393 0.468 0.432 0.431 0.421 0.523 0.089 0.735 0.160 1
Notes: Night light density in 2012 from the NOAA DMSP database. Observations calculated at the LGA-Ethnic level. Highest correlation between night lights
density and functional grid based power (.62) and also between night lights density and working flush toilets (.69). Overall for the aggregate infrastructure
indicators, night light density has highest correlation with functional Power (≈ .6) over Sanitation (≈ .4) and Water(≈ .4) in the country suggesting that the
Power and Grid variables from school level surveys accurately proxy mean distribution of available functional electricity for the country.
Table 4: Night Light Density and Health Access Correlation Matrix (Night light density positively
associated with health professional density (.55))
Correlations Night Lights Health Prof. Dens. Yellow Fever Imm. Meningitis Imm.
Night Lights 1 0.551 −0.160 −0.177
Health Professional Density 0.551 1 −0.192 −0.171
Yellow Fever Immunization −0.160 −0.192 1 0.385
Meningitis Immunization −0.177 −0.171 0.385 1
Notes: See text for details.
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Table 5: H0: Positive impacts, on average, of precolonial ethnic state centralization on access to federally administrated goods
for which cooperative centralized ethnic state leaders were better positioned then and today to bargain for access with federal
authorities
Grid Night Lights Flush Health Prof. Yellow Fever Imm. Meningitis Imm.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Centralization 0.041∗∗ 0.092∗ 0.019. 0.517∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗ 0.047∗∗
(0.018) (0.052) (0.013) (0.186) (0.034) (0.023)
Slavery 0.048 0.030 −0.032 −1.101∗ −0.084 0.104∗∗
(0.066) (0.166) (0.050) (0.667) (0.091) (0.044)
Petrol 0.078∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 1.380∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.026
(0.024) (0.096) (0.032) (0.298) (0.027) (0.016)
Constant −0.455 2.039∗∗ 0.152 16.560∗ 0.053 −0.297
(0.355) (1.011) (0.227) (8.871) (0.805) (0.423)
Population Density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Disease control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 821 821 821 799 799 799
R2 0.148 0.417 0.307 0.178 0.027 0.085
Adjusted R2 0.139 0.411 0.299 0.168 0.016 0.075
Notes: Regressions estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by state.Flush toilet access just barely misses significance
cut off at .15, which is mostly a power issue, I estimate. Disease control includes malaria. Geographic controls include ruggedness, mean
elevation, agricultural land suitability and distance to capital except in the interaction case where the distance variable was dropped due to
collinearity with the muslim indicator. Results remain significant in most specifications when the full Centralization index is used. Interaction is
not significant in all models except (6), where the effect is positive, but main effects are not sigificant and effect on Centralization is insignificantly
different from 0. Population density is included in all specifications in the full model. ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5
percent level, ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 6: H0: Precolonial ethnic state centralization has no effect for LGA administrated low
federal state control goods: Offgrid, Pit Latrines, Water Access
Offgrid Sanitation Latrine Water Piped Tubewell
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Centralization 0.017 0.042 0.020 0.019 0.006 0.021
(0.011) (0.040) (0.034) (0.019) (0.008) (0.026)
Slavery 0.054 −0.145 −0.071 0.163∗∗ 0.046 0.138∗∗
(0.040) (0.092) (0.078) (0.066) (0.032) (0.064)
Petrol 0.044∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.019 0.030 0.021∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.050) (0.061) (0.028) (0.011) (0.025)
Constant −0.450∗ 0.353 0.133 −1.072∗∗∗ −0.242 −0.431
(0.251) (0.668) (0.614) (0.371) (0.151) (0.420)
Population Density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Disease control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 821 821 821 821 821 821
R2 0.106 0.143 0.029 0.126 0.055 0.085
Adjusted R2 0.096 0.134 0.018 0.116 0.045 0.075
Notes: Regressions estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by state. Disease control includes malaria. Geographic
controls include ruggedness, mean elevation, agricultural land suitability and distance to capital. Results remain insignificant when the full
Centralization index is used. Results remain insignificant when the supermajority muslim interaction is included. Population density is included
in all specifications in the full model. ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 7: H1: Negative impacts of precolonial centralization on access to high federal state control infrastructure for non-
cooperative ethnic states and More Negative impacts under punishment regimes where f2 = 0
Grid Flush
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Centralization 0.041∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.019. 0.031∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.025) (0.036) (0.013) (0.017) (0.025)
Supermajority Muslim 0.020 0.026 −0.027 −0.018
(0.028) (0.028) (0.025) (0.022)
No Military President 0.028 0.050∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.017)
CentXMus −0.079∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗ −0.059∗∗
(0.035) (0.036) (0.025) (0.024)
CentXNo Military −0.073∗∗ −0.048∗∗
(0.033) (0.023)
Slavery 0.048 0.001 −0.001 −0.032 −0.054 −0.053
(0.066) (0.057) (0.053) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
Petrol 0.078∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030)
Constant −0.455 −0.335 −0.273 0.152 0.252 0.187
(0.355) (0.306) (0.277) (0.227) (0.194) (0.206)
Population Density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Disease control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 821 821 821 821 821 821
R2 0.148 0.166 0.175 0.307 0.339 0.340
Adjusted R2 0.139 0.156 0.163 0.299 0.331 0.331
Notes: Regressions estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by state. Dependent variable measures Grid access in (1)
-(3) and Flush toilet access in (4)-(6). Disease control includes malaria. Geographic controls include ruggedness, mean elevation, agricultural
land suitability and distance to capital except in the interaction case where the distance variable was dropped due to collinearity with the muslim
indicator. Population density is included in all specifications in the full model. ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent
level, ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
33
Table 8: First stage results: Ecological Diversity predicts precolonial state centralization
Precolonial State Centralization
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ecological Diversity 0.188∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046)
Constant −2.490∗∗∗ −2.490∗∗∗ −2.203∗∗∗ −2.203∗∗∗
(0.784) (0.782) (0.784) (0.784)
Population Density Yes No Yes No
Disease control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Supermajority Interaction No No Yes Yes
N 821 821 821 821
R2 0.118 0.116 0.540 0.539
Adjusted R2 0.108 0.108 0.534 0.534
F Statistic 208.29∗∗∗ (df = 9; 811) 238.83∗∗∗ (df = 8; 812) 922.14∗∗∗ (df = 10; 810) 1021.08∗∗∗ (df = 9; 811)
Notes: IV 2SLS regression first stage OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Disease control includes malaria. Geographic controls include
ruggedness, mean elevation, agricultural land suitability and distance to capital in (1) and (2), distance to capital excluded in (3) and (4) due to collinearity. Other
controls include slavery and petrol. Results remain significant when the full Centralization index is used. Results remain significant when the supermajority
muslim interaction is included. Interpretation of results in (3) and (4) interaction case should be taken with caution due to collinearity between the muslim
indicator and supermajority muslim interaction on the RHS. Population density is included in all specifications in the full model. ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent
level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
34
Table 9: OLS and IV results: Effect of Centralization with punishment regime on access to high state control goods: Grid based
Power and flush toilets
Grid (OLS) Grid (IV) Flush (OLS) Flush (IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Centralization 0.041∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗ 0.457∗ 0.019. 0.031∗ 0.575∗∗∗ 0.478∗
(0.018) (0.025) (0.204) (0.292) (0.013) (0.017) (0.176) (0.306)
Supermajority Muslim 0.020 0.373 −0.027 0.381
(0.028) (0.261) (0.025) (0.281)
CentXMus −0.079∗∗ −0.471∗ −0.051∗∗ −0.503∗
(0.035) (0.297) (0.025) (0.310)
Constant −0.455 −0.335 0.595 0.457 0.152 0.252 1.452∗∗∗ 1.165∗∗
(0.355) (0.306) (0.574) (0.706) (0.227) (0.194) (0.349) (0.538)
Population Density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Disease control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 821 821 821 821 821 821 821 821
R2 0.148 0.166 0.160 0.162 0.307 0.339 0.331 0.344
Adjusted R2 0.139 0.156 0.151 0.152 0.299 0.331 0.324 0.336
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by state. Dependent variable measures Grid access in (1)-(4), Flush toilet access in (5 -(8). Disease control
includes malaria. Geographic controls include ruggedness, mean elevation, agricultural land suitability and distance to capital except in the interaction case
where the distance variable not included. Other controls include slavery and petrol. Results remain significant in most specifications when the full Centralization
index is used. Population density is included in all specifications in the full model. ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level,
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 10: IV second stage results: The effects of centralization on Federally administrated goods and the punishment regime for
high state control goods (Grid based power and Flush toilets access) persist in the IV specification
Power Grid Night Lights Health Prof. Dens. Flush
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Centralization 0.862∗∗∗ 0.807∗∗ 0.490∗∗ 0.457∗ 1.252∗∗ 0.924 8.657∗∗∗ 0.4776∗
(0.236) (0.350) (0.204) (0.292) (0.594) (1.095) (1.931) (0.306)
Supermajority Muslim 0.647∗∗ 0.373 0.651 0.3806
(0.316) (0.261) (1.004) (0.281)
CentXMus −0.820∗∗ −0.471∗ −0.894 −0.5030∗
(0.356) (0.297) (1.107) (0.310)
Slavery −0.460∗∗∗ −0.450∗ −0.263∗ −0.263 −0.773∗∗ −0.617 −6.715∗∗∗ −0.359∗∗
(0.151) (0.230) (0.143) (0.202) (0.336) (0.656) (1.336) (0.178)
Petrol 0.020 0.032 0.035 0.040 0.423∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.605∗ 0.081∗∗
(0.043) (0.041) (0.036) (0.036) (0.131) (0.134) (0.329) (0.041)
Constant 0.969 0.726 0.595 0.457 4.753∗∗∗ 3.953∗ 35.444∗∗∗ 1.166∗∗
(0.590) (0.798) (0.574) (0.706) (1.371) (2.041) (8.104) (0.538)
Population Density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Disease control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 821 821 821 821 821 821 799 821
R2 0.188 0.197 0.160 0.162 0.424 0.427 0.195 0.344
Adjusted R2 0.179 0.187 0.151 0.152 0.417 0.420 0.186 0.336
Notes: IV 2SLS estimates reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by state. Dependent variable measures Power access in (1) and (2), Grid
access in (3) and (4), Night lights density in (5) and (6), Health professional density in (7) and Flush toilet access in (8). Effect on flush toilets is weak, due to
its tenuous nature as a ’high state control good’ after the 1977 instance mentioned in the text. Disease control includes malaria. Geographic controls include
ruggedness, mean elevation, agricultural land suitability and distance to capital except in the interaction case where the distance variable was dropped due
to collinearity with the muslim indicator. Estimates from (2), (4), (6) and (8) with the interaction term should be interpreted with caution due to collinearity
in the first stage. Results remain significant when the full Centralization index is used. Population density is included in all specifications in the full model.
∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 11: IV second stage results: Precolonial ethnic state centralization has no effect for LGA
administrated low federal state control goods
Sanitation Latrine Water Piped Tubewell
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Centralization 0.350 −0.217 0.368 −0.007 0.359
(0.366) (0.345) (0.265) (0.084) (0.285)
Slavery −0.358 0.093 −0.079 0.055 −0.096
(0.264) (0.243) (0.174) (0.065) (0.201)
Petrol 0.110∗ 0.041 −0.004 0.022 0.038
(0.060) (0.068) (0.041) (0.013) (0.038)
Constant 1.072 −0.420 −0.255 −0.270 0.360
(1.280) (1.212) (0.700) (0.259) (0.787)
Population Density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Disease control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 821 821 821 821 821
R2 0.144 0.030 0.132 0.055 0.093
Adjusted R2 0.135 0.019 0.122 0.045 0.083
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by state. Disease control includes malaria. Geo-
graphic controls include ruggedness, mean elevation, agricultural land suitability and distance to capital.
Results remain significant when the full Centralization index is used. Population density is included in
all specifications in the full model. Note ’Offgrid access’ not included here due to possible failure of the
exclusion restriction with offgrid or access to solar based electricity and ecological diversity (see Pausas
and Austin, 2001) ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗Significant at
the 10 percent level.
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Table 12: Respondents from punished (S.Mus) areas in centralized states seem to report lower
trust in federal institutions (police) over traditional leaders
’Trust’ in Police Over Traditional Leaders (Cent=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
S.Muslim −0.165 −0.165 −0.216∗ −0.211∗ −0.238∗
(0.115) (0.112) (0.117) (0.130) (0.138)
Slavery 0.063 0.022
(0.050) (0.051)
Petrol −0.123 −0.110 −0.081 −0.143 −0.086
(0.115) (0.114) (0.102) (0.109) (0.109)
Constant 0.396∗∗∗ 3.347∗∗∗ 3.458∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗ 0.380
(0.049) (1.269) (1.219) (0.105) (0.351)
Population Density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Disease control No Yes Yes No No
Geographic control No No Yes No Yes
N 210 210 174 209 173
R2 0.071 0.086 0.098 0.083 0.082
Adjusted R2 0.058 0.068 0.060 0.065 0.043
Notes: Regressions estimated by OLS. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by state. Dependent variable measures choice of police over
traditional leaders as first resort for help when the respondent has been victim of a violent crime. Disease control includes malaria. Geographic
controls include ruggedness, mean elevation and agricultural land suitability. Full index of slavery based on V70 from the Ethnographic atlas
and Fenske (2014)’s specification is used here to avoid singularities. Slavery is coded into 4 levels, where 0 is ’absence or near absence’ and 3 is
’hereditary and socially significant’. Results remain significant when the full Centralization index is used. Population density is included in all
specifications but (1). ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Figure 6: Precolonal centralization has a positive effect on grid access in cooperative ethnic states:
First order stochastic dominance of distribution of grid access in centralized (purple) vs. non-
centralized (blue) states
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Figure 7: Precolonal centralization has a positive effect on flush access in cooperative ethnic
states: First order stochastic dominance of distribution of flush access in centralized (purple) vs.
non-centralized states
Figure 8: Respondents from Precolonial Centralized areas subjected to punishment regime (prox-
ied by supermajority muslim indicator) report less ’trust in police over traditional leaders’ than
their centralized counterparts in non-punishment regime states: 1= police, 3=traditional leaders
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7 Appendix
7.1 Evidence from Nigerian Historiography: Cooperation, Punishment and Access to Public
Infrastructure Services under Cooperative Federalist, Dual Authority Regimes in Precolo-
nial Nigeria to Present
7.2 Precolonial Nigeria: c. 1850s
By the 1850s, in the territory that became known as Nigeria, some central plotlines are identified
by historians of this period. First is the presence of more or less centralized ethnic states, with
broadly, monarchial Yorubaland (headed by the Alafin and attendant council) to the Southwest,
The Edo and monarchial Benin Kingdom (headed by the Oba and attendant council) to the
South South, monarchial Hausaland (headed by the Hausa kings) to the Northwest, the Bornu
kingdom (headed by the Mai) to the Northeast and The less centralized but still with organized
chieftaincy and governance structures and impressive trading capacities among their subgroup,
the Aro, Ibos/Igbos to the Southeast (Falola, 2005; Ogundiran, 2005). Then there were the so-
called "stateless" or non-centralized societies like the Ekoi to the South, the Bakakari to the North
sprinkled in between throughout the region as depicted in (c) of figure x.
Another major thread is the nearing of the close of the Atlantic slave trade, the collapse of
the Old Oyo Empire in Yoruba land unleashing unprecedented levels of warfare in the region
and contributing to the expansion of sovereignty crystallized in Murdock’s 1967 Atlas (Dudley,
1968; Ogbomo, 2005). Most important for this paper’s thesis during this period, however is the
expansion of the infamous Sokoto caliphate political state spearheaded by Usman Dan Fodio at
the beginning of the 19th century and transforming most of Northern Nigeria through a series of
jihads into Islamic political states by the mid 19th century headed by religious/political Fulani
rulers titled ’Emirs’ as depicted in (d) in Figure/refnigeria. This expansion would have important
consequences for the doctrine of indirect rule that followed and the differential application of this
doctrine in the converted muslim North, particularly the supermajority muslim North versus the
area delineated South (and consisting of areas not part of the Sokoto caliphate) during the period
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of British colonial rule (Dudley, 1968).
7.3 British Colonial Nigeria: 1885-1960
The colonial period in Nigeria dates as far back as 1800, with events like the annexation of La-
gos as a crown colony in 1861, heralding the eventual British occupation of the area that would
come to be known as Nigeria in 1885. Until 1900, cooperation between ethnic state kings and the
British colonial regime, headed by Sir Frederick Lugard in Nigeria was sometimes with ethnic
state kings rebelling against British encroachments on their sovereignty with 2 notable examples
being the opposition by King Jaja of Opobo and Oba Ovonranmwen of Benin in 1897 (Ogbomo,
2005). Punishment however was swift and brutal in the case of the latter, with both monar-
chs deposed and exiled and a bloody, destructive ’punitive expedition’ in 1897 throughout the
Benin empire (Ogbomo, 2005; Otoide, 2005). The lessons for centralized ethnic state leaders, who
might have had incentive to vie with the British colonials over sovereignty in their area was clear,
these new entrants to the political field had no sympathy ( f j = 0) for detractors and retaliation,
punishment for non-cooperating entities would be brutal and swift; on the other hand, for co-
operators with the regime, the rewards could be plentiful in the form of increased autonomy in
one’s jurisdictions and the benefits thereof under indirect rule as discussed below. By 1900, all of
Nigeria, including the previously antagonistic Sokoto caliphate, had been brought under British
rule. However, once centralized ethnic state leaders surrendered, a ’pacifist’ approach under the
system of indirect rule became the rule of the day.
Under Lugard’s doctrine of indirect rule, centralized ethnic state leaders were given autonomy
over their regions crystallized in a series of legislations starting with the Native Courts procla-
mation in 1900 and followed by the Native Revenue Proclamation in 1904. Authority over tax
collection and administration of justice within their areas was afforded to centralized ethnic state
kings. As of this time Nigeria was administered as 2 separate provinces, a Northern Province
headed by Lugard and aligned with the boundaries of the Sokoto caliphate and a Southern
province. Impressed with the extent of the Sokoto caliphate, its high tax bureaucratic capacity
and highly hierarchical nature of the ’Muslim North’, and eager to consolidate support of the
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ruling elite in the area as a strategy for solidifying British rule in the area, Lugard pursued a pol-
icy of complete non-intervention in Northern Nigeria where he promised the Sultan of Sokoto in
1903 to have "non-intervention in matters of religion or ’tradition’" This doctrine was crystallized
in the Native Authority Proclamation of 1907 where the Emir became the sole Native Authority
within their jurisdictions in a hyper-centralization of power in the hands of these figures. Note
this was a significant break with the practice in the 1850 period, as while the Emirate system was
highly hierarchical, there had existed "various middlemen" in the ’traditional’ precolonial system
who acted as a manner of checks for the power of the Emir (Dudley, 1968; Mustapha, 2006). With
the hypercentralization of power in the hands of the Emir, these middlemen had their posts ’abol-
ished’, leading to unprecedented near despotic levels of power afforded to Emirs in the Muslim
North of the country and prompting FW de St Croix to comment that "Not only was authority of
the Emir unchecked by his Council...the Emir quickly became an absolute ruler" (Dudley, 1968).
Added to Lugard’s ideological vision of fashioning the Muslim North as a "modern, aristocratic
Anglo-Muslim" region (Mustapha, 2006) that would be free of the ’challenging, revolutionary’
influences of Christian missionary led ’Western education’ on the local populace that was pro-
liferating in the South (and that led Graham to make the observation ’It was Lugard’s view that
in Southern Nigeria, "education had produced men discontented, impatient of any control and
obsessed with their own importance" ’(Mustapha, 2006; Graham 1966:136; Dudley, 1968)) and of
course, completely under British control, and the divide in administration between the Northern
and Southern protectorates became so wide that even after the amalgamation of the 2 protec-
torates into a single Nigeria in 1914, so disparate were the political systems in both that years
later in 1939, on visiting the Southern Lagos for the first time, the Northern Premier Sir Ahmadu
Bello "viewed with a lack of comprehension, with suspicion and dissatisfaction Southern politics
and politicians" (Dudley, 1968).
And so it continued, that while political power of centralized ethnic state leaders in the South
became more and more decentralized, with emergent Western educated elites increasingly ex-
pressing their disdain for ’backward political systems’ and their desire for more power in the
colonial political structure culminating in the replacement of the Native Authority system with
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elected local councils under the Local Government Ordinance of 1950 which relegated South-
ern ethnic state or traditional leaders to merely ceremonial roles, in the North, power became
increasingly centralized in the hands of Emirs, particularly in states with high majority muslim
populations after first, the Native Authority Ordinance of 1933 reclassified Native Authorities,
modifying the policy with regards to ’Non-Muslim areas of the North’ and the Native Authority
Law of 1954 which further consolidated power in the hands of high majority muslim emirs with
allowances afforded for the introduction of justice systems based on Sharia law in these areas
(Dudley, 1968; Tonwe and Osemwota, 2013).
So it was that by the end of the colonial era and independence in 1960, there were 2 very dif-
ferent systems of local governance in Nigeria, one in the North, particularly the high majority
muslim North, where Emirs were afforded near absolute power over their jurisdictions under the
Native Authority system and one in the South and non-high majority muslim North where more
decentralized, democratic systems of local governance had cropped up to erode the authority
of centralized ethnic state leaders in the area. At this time, investment in infrastructure by the
British was minimal and largely catered to the needs of British residents with two small gener-
ating sets built to serve British colonials in Lagos in 1886 (Sambo, 2012). It was not till towards
the close of the colonial period in 1951 that the federally controlled Electricity Corporation of
Nigeria (ECN) was established in the country with the next significant investment/innovation
in the country’s power infrastructure not occurring till 1972 when the National Electric Power
Authority (NEPA) was formed under military rule (Sambo, 2012).
7.4 Military Nigeria: 1966-1999
Fast forwarding past the brief detour into democracy between 1960-1966 and apart from a short
period of pseudo-’democracy’ between 1979-1983, the subsequent next 30 or so years of Nigerian
history were characterized by autocratic military rule replacing the previous autocratic British
colonial regime. Most significantly for the story of cooperation between the centralized ethnic
state leaders under the Native Administration system that still existed in formidable form in the
high majority or supermajority Muslim North, was the slow erosion of Native Authority and the
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Emir’s powers by military officials who wanted to consolidate power and feared the influence of
these Emirs (Mustapha, 2006; Tonwe and Osemwota, 2013). In light of the efforts by the military
regime to undermine the authorities of the Northern, Muslim Emirate/Native Authority local
governance system, the military period has been described as "traumatic for muslim establish-
ment of Northern Nigeria" (Hickey, 1984). At no time was this trauma more evident than in the
complete demolition of the Native Authority system with the establishment of the 1976 Local
Government Reform law that removed traditional leaders from politics, virtually banned them
from participation in democratically elected local governments with the establishment of the Lo-
cal Government Area as the smallest constitutionally acknowledged unit of local administration
in the country and shafted ethnic state/traditional rulers to mere advisory roles, if even that in
some cases. The break was traumatic for the rule of the Emirs particularly under the high Muslim
majority states where they had enjoyed near absolute levels of autonomy over their territories for
almost a century under British colonial policy. And understandably, the move spurred enormous
opposition from traditional leaders in these areas. In the South, however where previously men-
tioned laws had already greatly subdued the powers of traditional rulers, there was little or no
opposition to the 1976 law. (Tonwe and Osomwota, 2013; Hickey, 1984; Mustapha, 2006; Blench
et al., 2006).
It should also be noted that part of the reason the military regime felt comfortable completely
dismantling the Native Authority regime in 1976, traditionally in charge of tax collection in their
locales, was that around the same time in 1973, an oil boom, meant Nigeria was now flush with
revenue from petrol and for perhaps the first time in the country’s history, its federal govern-
ment no longer depended on tax revenue for its income (Tonwe and Osemwota, 2013). With the
new petrorevenue, came investment in a series of public works projects in the 1970s-1980s and
most notably a cash grant given out as incentive to areas which installed septic tanks and flush
toilets after the abolishment of the bucket latrine system by federal decree in 1977 (Uduku, 1994).
With the high federal state control of the electricity infrastructure through NEPA, the high fed-
eral state control of flush toilet access at primary public schools through the cash grant scheme
(which the government had taken over in 1974-1976), the new petrol fueled independence of the
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military government from the local traditional rulers and subsequent abolishment of the Native
Authority system, what this meant for non-cooperating Northern traditional rulers refusing to
relinquish political power under the 1976 law from these high majority muslim areas who had
experienced the most ’trauma’ over loss of political power post the 1976 law was that punishment
from the regime was able to take on a different form than punishment for non-cooperation had
been under the British colonial era. Namely, the military strategy transformed from one of swift
punishment of rebellious traditional rulers in the form of exile and occasionally execution (a la
the British), to one of not-so benign neglect of jurisdictions ruled by non-cooperating Emirs, with
underinvestment in these high state control goods becoming the dominant strategy by military
elites during this period (Tonwe and Osemwota, 2013; Mustapha, 2006; Olasupo, 2001; Blench et
al., 2006). This punishment of underinvestment was particularly pronounced in areas with no
cleavage to the military government (Mustapha, 2006; Blench et. al, 2006; Osaghae, 2006) particu-
larly where the military presidents themselves did not originate. And the tension and discontent
spawned by this non-cooperation was evident throughout the supermajority Muslim states with
a series of riots, so called ’muslim uprisings’ breaking out in Northern supermajority muslim
cities in the 1980s with a particularly bloody, infamous one being the 1982 Maitatsine uprisings
in Maiduguri (capital of Borno state, former homeland of the precolonial Bornu kingdom) in
Nigeria (Hickey, 1984).
7.5 And Today: Traditional Leaders and Local Government Areas and Public Service Provi-
sion
The relationship between the current democratic regime and traditional rulers, particularly with
historically precolonial era centralized ethnic state leaders has somewhat changed from the mili-
tary era. The current strategy by the federal government has been to gain legitimacy in formerly
centralized areas by lobbying the support of traditional leaders from these areas calling on their
social capital with their citizenry to resolve internal conflicts in their regions and promote federal
policies like the 2012 national immunization efforts (Blench et. al, 2006; Tonwe and Osemwota,
2006; Johns Hopkins, 2012). Here as in the past, cooperative traditional leaders from formerly
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centralized ethnic states, that are often the target of the federal government relationship building
for all the reasons mentioned previously, are able to benefit from the bargaining with federal
authorities for greater access to currently federally controlled resources for their areas, among
which were the health/immunization efforts of 2012. Today, constitutional local governance is
at the level of the LGA and not the Native Administration system in Nigeria. From the orig-
inal just over 300 created in 1976, there are currently 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs) in
Nigeria today. Broadly, the governance of the LGAs has 2 main parts, a Policy making body
and an Executive body. Council members are elected in a democratic process and the Policy
making department is headed by 4 main executives- the executive chairman, the vice chair-
man, the supervisory councilor and the councilor, complemented by 3 groups of personnel in
the Executive body- the secretary, head of departments and subordinate staff. The departments
are further divided into 7 parts, the General and Administrative Department, the treasury, the
Works department, the Health Department, the Maternity Division of the medical department,
the Dispensary Division of the Medical Department and the Farm Division. Some of the duties
of the LGA include responsibility for sanitation access- including pit latrine maintenance, most
immunization programs (with the exception of the 2012 date of the survey, where as will be dis-
cussed in the Data section, the national government intervened to ramp up child immunization
efforts hosting its first ever national vaccine summit in the capital Abuja in 2012, and spurring
the classification in this paper of immunization in 2012 as a federally administrated, but medium
federal state control good (Johns Hopkins, 2012)) , the health centers, maternity center adminis-
tration, water supply- including its rural and urban extension, construction and maintenance of
primary schools, town planning and care of markets and motor-parks. Under the current system,
LGAs are allocated funds from the federal government (up to 20% of federal revenue as of 2004
(Khemani, 2004)) which they can use to attend to the aforementioned responsibilities. Of the
problems cited by observers of the system are the presence of too many actors, with difficulty
reaching consensus on projects to pursue with subsequent high incentives for corrupt activities in
the absence of accountability mechanisms from the federal government and where staff are often
underpaid or not paid at all; lack of accountability is also partly driven by the lack of continu-
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ity of LGA governments and executives within LGA governments (Olanipekun, 1988; Khemani,
2004; Olowu and Erero, 1995). In this multilateral bargaining framework, there is no role for the
ethnic state/traditional leaders in the bargaining/decision making process and hence no effect
of ethnic state centralization on locally administrated, low federal state control goods.
7.6 Robustness checks
Table 13: Robustness check: split sample for S.Mus=0 and 1; effects retain sign at 90% and 95%
Confidence level
Grid, S.Mus=1 Grid, S.Mus=0 Flush, S.Mus=1 Flush, S.Mus=0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Centralization −0.055∗∗ 0.071∗∗ −0.028. 0.032∗
(0.028) (0.029) (0.021) (0.017)
Petrol 0.058∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.031)
Slavery 0.040∗∗ −0.007 0.008 0.020
(0.016) (0.015) (0.011) (0.036)
Constant −0.214 −0.235 0.553∗∗∗ −0.085
(0.212) (0.293) (0.105) (0.161)
Population Density Yes Yes Yes Yes
Disease control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes No
N 215 601 215 606
R2 0.244 0.125 0.341 0.253
Adjusted R2 0.219 0.114 0.318 0.244
Notes: Regressions estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by state. Dependent variable measures Grid access in the
S.Mus=1 and S.Mus=0 split samples in (1) and (2) respectively, Flush access in the S.Mus=1 and S.Mus=0 split samples in (3) and (4). Disease
control includes malaria. Geographic controls include ruggedness, mean elevation, agricultural land suitability. Results remain significant
when the full Centralization index is used. Petrol omitted for S.Mus=1 case where no petrol deposits. Population density is included in all
specifications in the full model. ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 14: Robustness check: split sample for S.Mus=1 and Nomil=1 (punished and nonfavored);
effects retain sign at 90% Confidence level
Grid, S.Mus=1 Grid, S.Mus=1 and NoMil=1 Flush, S.Mus=1 Flush, S.Mus=1 and NoMil=1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Centralization −0.055∗∗ −0.064∗ −0.028. −0.036∗
(0.028) (0.038) (0.021) (0.021)
Slavery 0.040∗∗ 0.030 0.008 0.007
(0.016) (0.026) (0.011) (0.014)
Constant −0.214 −0.161 0.553∗∗∗ 0.557∗∗∗
(0.212) (0.329) (0.105) (0.110)
Population Density Yes Yes Yes Yes
Disease control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 215 109 215 109
R2 0.244 0.294 0.341 0.304
Adjusted R2 0.219 0.245 0.318 0.255
Notes: Regressions estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by state. Dependent variable measures Grid access in
the S.Mus=1 split samples in (1) and (2) respectively, Flush access in the S.Mus=1 split samples in (3) and (4). Disease control includes malaria.
Geographic controls include ruggedness, mean elevation, agricultural land suitability. Results remain significant when the full Centralization
index is used. Petrol omitted for S.Mus=1 case where no petrol deposits. Population density is included in all specifications in the full model.
∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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A second means of correcting for spatial autocorrelation is with the spatial error model which
has the form:
Y = Xβ+ e (8)
e = λWe+ ξ (9)
with: ξ assumed normal, mean 0 and homoskedastic (classical assumptions) and e as a vector of
error terms, weighted using the pre-specified spatial weights matrix W, λ as the scalar parameter
of the spatial error term. Note, rewriting Y with the solved error term, reveals non-linearity in the
model, and the coefficients are estimated by maximum likelihood. A number of spatial weights
were tested here, and sample results for grid access and meningitis immunization availability for
W = KNN(4) - the symmetric 4 nearest neighbors spatial weight matrix are presented below.
Dependence on the specification of the spatial weight matrix for estimation of the coefficients is
an issue here, with coefficient estimates on Centralization differing slightly from the OLS with
clustered errors model here.
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Table 15: Spatial Error Model Results W=KNN(4), for Grid Access and Meningitis Immunization











Population Density Yes Yes
Disease control Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes
N 945 945
Log Likelihood 548.504 304.093
Notes: Regressions estimated by ML. Dependent variable measures Grid access and Meningitis Immunization
availability. Disease control includes malaria. Geographic controls include ruggedness, mean elevation, agricul-
tural land suitability. Population density is included in all specifications in the full model. ∗∗∗Significant at the
1 percent level, ∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level, ∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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